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Executive Summary
Computational 
propaganda – the 
use of algorithms, 
automation, and big 
data to shape public 
life – is becoming 
a pervasive and 
ubiquitous part of 
everyday life. 
Over the past three years, we have monitored the 
global organization of social media manipulation by 
governments and political parties. Our 2019 report 
analyses the trends of computational propaganda 
and the evolving tools, capacities, strategies, and 
resources. 
1. Evidence of organized social media manipulation 
campaigns which have taken place in 70 countries, 
up from 48 countries in 2018 and 28 countries in 
2017. In each country, there is at least one political 
party or government agency using social media to 
shape public attitudes domestically (Figure 1). 
2. Social media has become co-opted by many 
authoritarian regimes. In 26 countries, 
computational propaganda is being used as 
a tool of information control in three distinct 
ways: to suppress fundamental human rights, 
discredit political opponents, and drown out 
dissenting opinions (Figure 2). 
3. A handful of sophisticated state actors use 
computational propaganda for foreign influence 
operations. Facebook and Twitter attributed 
foreign influence operations to seven countries 
(China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
and Venezuela) who have used these platforms to 
influence global audiences (Figure 3).
4. China has become a major player in the global 
disinformation order. Until the 2019 protests in Hong 
Kong, most evidence of Chinese computational 
propaganda occurred on domestic platforms such 
as Weibo, WeChat, and QQ. But China’s new-found 
interest in aggressively using Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube should raise concerns for democracies
5. Despite there being more social networking 
platforms than ever, Facebook remains the 
platform of choice for social media manipulation. 
In 56 countries, we found evidence of formally 
organized computational propaganda campaigns 
on Facebook. (Figure 4).
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Although propaganda has always been a part of political 
discourse, the deep and wide-ranging scope of these campaigns 
raise critical public interest concerns.  
Cyber troops’ are defined as government or political party 
actors tasked with manipulating public opinion online 
(Bradshaw and Howard 2017a). We comparatively examine 
the formal organization of cyber troops around the world, and 
how these actors use computational propaganda for political 
purposes. This involves building an inventory of the evolving 
strategies, tools, and techniques of computational propaganda, 
including the use of ‘political bots’ to amplify hate speech or 
other forms of manipulated content, the illegal harvesting of 
data or micro-targeting, or deploying an army of ‘trolls’ to bully 
or harass political dissidents or journalists online. We also track 
the capacity and resources invested into developing these 
techniques to build a picture of cyber troop capabilities around 
the world. 
The use of computational propaganda to shape public attitudes 
via social media has become mainstream, extending far beyond 
the actions of a few bad actors. In an information environment 
characterized by high volumes of information and limited 
levels of user attention and trust, the tools and techniques of 
computational propaganda are becoming a common – and 
arguably essential – part of digital campaigning and public 
diplomacy. In addition to building a globally comparative picture 
of cyber troop activity, we also hope to drive public and scholarly 
debate about how we define and understand the changing 
nature of politics online, and how technologies can and should 
be used to enhance democracy and the expression of human 
rights online. 
In this year’s report, we examine cyber troop activity in 70 
countries: Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, 
China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Honduras, 
Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mexico, Moldova, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi 
Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Around the world, 
government 
actors are using 






trust in the liberal 
international order.
Introduction
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have begun publishing limited information about influence 
operations on their platforms – have taken action against 
cyber troops engaged in foreign influence operations in seven 
countries: China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and 
Venezuela. Although this measure does not capture the extent 
to which foreign influence operations are taking place, we can 
confidently begin to build a picture of this highly secretive 
phenomenon.  
 
China Flexes its Misinformation Muscle  
Until recently, we found that China rarely used social media to 
manipulate public opinion in other countries. The audience for 
computational propaganda has mainly focused on domestic 
platforms, such as Weibo, WeChat, and QQ. However, in 2019 
the Chinese government began to employ global social media 
platforms to paint Hong Kong’s democracy advocates as 
violent radicals with no popular appeal (Lee Myers and Mozur 
2019). Beyond domestically bound platforms, the growing 
sophistication and use of global social networking technologies 
demonstrates how China is also turning to these technologies 
as a tool of geopolitical power and influence.
Facebook is Still Number One 
Despite there being more platforms than ever, Facebook 
remains the dominant platform for cyber troop activity. Part 
of the reason for this could be explained by its market size – 
as one of the world’s largest social networking platforms – as 
well as the specific affordances of the platform, such as close 
family and friend communication, a source of political news 
and information, or the ability to form groups and pages. Since 
2018, we have collected evidence of more cyber troop activity 
on image- and video-sharing platforms such as Instagram and 
YouTube. We have also collected evidence of cyber troops 
running campaigns on WhatsApp. We think these platforms 
will grow in importance over the next few years as more 
people use these social networking technologies for political 
communication.
Sweden, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
Growing Evidence of Computational Propaganda 
Around the World
We found evidence of organised social media manipulation 
campaigns in 70 countries, up from 48 countries in 2018 and 
28 countries in 2017. Some of this growth comes from new 
entrants who are experimenting with the tools and techniques 
of computational propaganda during elections or as a new tool 
of information control. However, journalists, academics, and 
activists are also better equipped with digital tools and a more 
precise vocabulary to identify, report, and uncover instances 
of formally organized social media manipulation. Over the 
past three years we have been able to refine our language 
and search terms for identifying instances of computational 
propaganda, and we found that many countries have displayed 
elements of formally organized social media manipulation for 
the past decade. As a result, we suggest that computational 
propaganda has become a ubiquitous and pervasive part of the 
digital information ecosystem. 
The Co-Option of Social Media in Authoritarian 
Regimes
In many authoritarian regimes, computational propaganda 
has become a tool of information control that is strategically 
used in combination with surveillance, censorship, and threats 
of violence. We have catalogued the kinds of campaigns 
authoritarian countries have used against journalists, political 
dissidents, and the broader society, and found three distinct 
ways in which computational propaganda is used:  
(1) to suppress fundamental human rights; 
(2) to discredit political opposition; and 
(3) to drown out political dissent. 
The co-option of social media technologies provides authoritarian 
regimes with a powerful tool to shape public discussions and 
spread propaganda online, while simultaneously surveilling, 
censoring, and restricting digital public spaces.  
A Limited Number of Foreign Influence   
Operations by Highly Sophisticated Actors
Foreign influence operations are an important area of concern 
but attributing computational propaganda to foreign state 
actors remains a challenge. Facebook and Twitter – who 
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FIGURE 1 - THE GLOBAL DISINFORMATION ORDER
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FIGURE 3 - FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS ON SOCIAL MEDIA
COUNTRIES ATTRIBUTED BY FACEBOOK AND TWITTER FOR ENGAGING IN FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
FIGURE 2 - COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA AS A TOOL OF INFORMATION CONTROL 


































Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: Facebook has also taken down accounts engaged in 'coordinated inauthentic behaviour' that are not 
explicitly linked to a government or political party. These takedowns include accounts originating from: Egypt, Macedonia, Kosovo, Thailand, and the United Arab 
Emirates. Additionally, some cyber troop activity identified by Facebook and Twitter is domestically focused, such as in the case of Bangladesh and Honduras, and is 
therefore not included in this figure on foreign operations.
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FIGURE 4 - PROMINENT PLATFORMS FOR SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION 
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The methodology for 
this report consists of 
four stages: 
1. a systematic content 
analysis of news 
articles reporting on 
cyber troop activity; 
2. a secondary 
literature review of 
public archives and 
scientific reports; 
3. drafting country 
case studies; and 
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For the past three years, our three-stage methodology has 
allowed us to successfully capture a wide range of public 
documents that shed light on the organized manipulation 
campaigns globally. There are almost certainly cyber troop 
operations that have not been publicly documented, and we 
have already seen these cases grow over time. While this report 
in no way is intended to provide a complete picture of how state 
actors are operating in this space, we can begin to build a bigger 
picture by piecing together public information. The country-
specific profiles and a full list of news items and secondary 
literature sources can be found on the 2019 report homepage.
Content analysis is an established research method in 
communication and media studies (Herring 2009). It has been 
used to help understand how the Internet and social media 
interact with political action, regime transformation, and 
digital control (Bradshaw and Howard 2018a, 2017b; Edwards, 
Howard, and Joyce 2013; Joyce, Antonio, and Howard 2013; 
Strange et al. 2013). This qualitative content analysis was 
conducted to understand the range of state actors who actively 
use social media to manipulate public opinion, as well as their 
capacity, strategies, and resources. We modelled our content 
analysis after last year’s report, using purposive sampling to 
build a coded spreadsheet of specific variables that appear 
in news articles. The following keywords were selected and 
used in combination for our search: bot; Cambridge Analytica; 
disinformation; Facebook; fake account; information warfare; 
Instagram; military; misinformation; propaganda; psychological 
operations; psyops; social media; sock puppet; troll; Twitter; 
WhatsApp; YouTube.
There are two major limitations to conducting our qualitative 
content analyses: media bias and language. To help mitigate 
bias, we used LexisNexis and the top three search engine 
providers – Google, Yahoo! and Bing – which provided hits to 
a variety of professional, local, and amateur news sources. To 
ensure that only high-quality news sources were being used to 
build our dataset, each article was given a credibility score using 
a three-point scale. Articles ranked at one came from major, 
professionally branded news organizations. Articles ranked at 
two came from smaller professional news organizations, local 
news organizations, or expert commentary and professional 
blogs. Articles ranked at three came from content farms, or 
personal or hyper-partisan blogs. These articles were removed 
from the sample. 
Language was a second limitation to conducting our qualitative 
content analysis. For this year’s global inventory, we were able 
to draw upon news articles and secondary resources written 
in Arabic, English, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, 
Persian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. We also 
worked with BBC monitoring1 who provided an additional portal 
for collecting and aggregating high-quality news and information 
on cyber troop activity, as well as translation services for news 
articles for Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Malaysia, North Macedonia, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan. We relied on English-language-only reporting for: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, China, Czech Republic, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Hungary, Israel, Moldova, Myanmar, Netherlands, 
North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Serbia, South Korea, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. 
After conducting a content analysis, a team of research 
assistants completed a secondary literature review to provide 
an in-depth profile of cyber troop activity in a specific country 
context. These case studies drew from the data collected in 
the content analysis, as well as an in-depth secondary literature 
review, where case study authors searched for other high-
quality open source information about cyber troop activity. This 
involved looking for government reports, think tank papers, 
academic and scholarly studies, and research conducted by 
civil society organizations. A complete archive of the news 
sources and secondary literature used in this report can be 
found in an online Zotero database. We hope this public library 
will help inform future research.  
After completing a qualitative content analysis and secondary 
literature review, research assistants synthesized the findings 
into short country case studies. The case studies provide more 
information about instances of computational propaganda we 
identified in the content analysis, as well as detailed information 
about the specific country context and media environment in 
which social media manipulations are taking place. In addition 
to the content analysis and secondary literature review, we 
completed a case study for 84% of the countries, which can be 
online in a data supplement alongside the report. 
Finally, the last step of our research methodology – 
consultations with experts – allowed us to peer review the 
case studies, as well as get feedback on the quality of English 
and local-language news reporting and secondary literature 
we found and discuss additional resources and citations in 
alternative languages with native speakers. Experts were asked 
to review the case studies drafted by research assistants, and 
(1) fact-check the information and data for accuracy; (2) provide 
additional citations to open source material; and (3) provide 
general feedback on the reliability of the data. In the cases of 
Poland, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tunisia, and Ukraine, we consulted 
experts on the data collected from the content analysis and 
literature review. 
1  https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/
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While many countries have seen an increase in computational 
propaganda on social media, attribution back to a particular 
actor remains difficult. 
In this report, we focus specifically on cyber troops – 
or government or political party use of social media to 
manipulate public opinion. In 44 countries, we found evidence 
of a government agency using computational propaganda 
to shape public attitudes. This category of actors includes 
communication or digital ministries or military-led campaigns. 
In countries considered ‘not free' according to Freedom 
House, we found evidence of a government ministry or ruling 
party using computational propaganda to shape attitudes 
domestically. In a small number of democracies, we found 
evidence of government or military-led initiatives. For this 
report, we counted the activities of the Joint Threat Research 
Intelligence Group (JTRIG) in the United Kingdom, who set 
up Facebook groups and created YouTube videos containing 
persuasive communications designed to “discredit, promote 
distrust, dissuade, deter, delay [and] disrupt” (Greenwald 
2015). We also counted activities in the United States, such 
as the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) programme that created a fake social network in Cuba 
(Greenwald 2014). As computational propaganda becomes an 
increasingly ubiquitous tool for politics, national security, and 
intelligence operations, we hope these examples drive further 
Cyber troop activity takes 
on many organizational 
forms and diverse actors 
are leveraging social media 
to shape public opinion, 
set political agendas, and 
propagate ideas. 
Organisational Form
conversations around what are appropriate, democratic and 
acceptable uses of these tools by state actors.  
In addition to government or military-led initiatives, we also 
looked at political parties. In 45 out of the 70 countries we 
analysed, we found evidence of political parties or politicians 
running for office who have used the tools and techniques of 
computational propaganda during elections. Here, we counted 
instances of politicians amassing fake followers, such as 
Mitt Romney in the United States (Carroll 2012), Tony Abbott 
in Australia (Rolfe 2013), or Geert Wilders in the Netherlands 
(Blood 2017). We also counted instances of parties using 
advertising to target voters with manipulated media, such as 
in India (Gleicher 2019), or instances of illegal micro-targeting 
such as the use of the firm Cambridge Analytica in the UK Brexit 
referendum by Vote Leave (Cadwalladr 2017). Finally, we further 
counted instances of political parties purposively spreading 
or amplifying disinformation on social networks, such as the 
WhatsApp campaigns in Brazil (Rio 2018), India (Dwoskin and 
Gowen 2018), and Nigeria (Hitchen et al. 2019). 
One important feature of the organization of manipulation 
campaigns is that cyber troops often work in conjunction with 
private industry, civil society organizations, Internet subcultures, 
youth groups, hacker collectives, fringe movements, social 
media influencers, and volunteers who ideologically support 
their cause. The distinction between these groups can often 
be difficult to draw, especially since activities can be implicitly 
and explicitly sanctioned by the state. In this report, we look for 
evidence of formal coordination or activities that are officially 
sanctioned by the state, rather than campaigns that might be 
implicitly sanctioned because of factors such as overlapping 
ideologies or goals. In 25 out of the 70 countries we found 
evidence of state actors working with private companies 
or strategic communication firms who offer computational 
propaganda as a service. In 30 out of the 70 countries, we 
found evidence of formal coordination between governments 
and citizens or civil society organizations. In some cases, like 
in Azerbaijan, Israel, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, student 
or youth groups are hired by government agencies to use 
computational propaganda.
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TABLE 1 - ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND PREVALENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION
Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: This table reports on the types of political actors using social media influence operations, and the number of examples of those 
organizations found. For government agencies, political parties, civil society groups, and private contractors, ■ = one organization found, ■ = two organizations found, ■ = three or more 
organizations found. Since it is difficult to assess the number of individual citizens using these tools, evidence of citizen use is indicated by ■.
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Account Types 
Fake accounts are used by cyber troops to spread computational 
propaganda. Over the past three years we have tracked the 
prevalence of three types of fake accounts: bot, human, and 
cyborg. Bots are highly automated accounts designed to 
mimic human behaviour online. They are often used to amplify 
narratives or drown out political dissent. We found evidence of 
bot accounts being used in 50 of the 70 countries. However, 
even more common than bots are human-run accounts, 
which do not make use of automation. Instead they engage in 
conversations by posting comments or tweets, or by private 
messaging individuals via social media platforms. Human-
operated accounts were found in 60 out of the 70 countries in 
this year’s report. Cyborg accounts, which blend automation 
with human curation, are another account type we identified. 
This year, we have added hacked or stolen accounts to our 
typology of fake accounts. Although these accounts are not 
‘fake’ per se, high profile accounts are strategically used by 
cyber troops in order to spread pro-government propaganda 
or to censor freedom of speech by revoking access to the 
account by its rightful owner. A small number of state actors 
have begun using stolen or hacked accounts as part of their 
campaigns, highlighting the interconnectivity of computational  
propaganda with more traditional forms of cyber-attacks. 
Finally, it is important to note that not all accounts used in cyber 
troop activities are fake. In some countries, like Vietnam or 
Tajikistan, state actors encourage cyber troops to use their real 
accounts to spread pro-government propaganda, troll political 
dissidents, or mass-report content. As social media companies 
become more aggressive in taking down accounts associated 
with cyber troop activity, the co-option of real accounts could 
become a more prominent strategy. 
Although there is 
nothing necessarily new 
about propaganda, the 
affordances of social 
networking technologies 
– algorithms, automation, 
and big data – change the 
scale, scope, and precision 
of how information is 
transmitted in the   
digital age. 





of countries used 
Human accounts
of countries used 
Cyborg accounts
of countries used 
Hacked or Stolen 
accounts
80%
of countries used 
Bot accounts
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TABLE 2 - FAKE ACCOUNT TYPES
Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: This table reports on the types of fake accounts identified between 2010-2019.  For fake social media account types:         = automated 
accounts,         = human accounts,           = cyborg accounts,        = Hacked or Stolen accounts,                               = no evidence found. 
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Messaging and Valence
Cyber troops use a variety of messaging and valence strategies 
when communicating with users online. Valence describes 
how attractive or unattractive a message, event, or thing is. For 
the 2019 report, we have expanded our typology of messaging 
and valence strategies that cyber troops use when engaging in 
conversations with users online:
(1) spreading pro-government or pro-party propaganda; 
(2) attacking the opposition or mounting smear campaigns; 
(3) distracting or diverting conversations or criticism away from 
important issues; 
(4) driving division and polarization; and 














to drive divisions 
within society
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TABLE 3 - MESSAGING AND VALENCE
Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: This table reports on the types of messaging and valence strategies of cyber troop activity between 2010-2019.  For social media 
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Communication Strategies
Cyber troops use a variety of communication strategies. We 
have categorized these activities into four categories:  
(1) the creation of disinformation or manipulated media; 
(2) mass-reporting of content or accounts; 
(3) data-driven strategies; 
(4) trolling, doxing or harassment;
(5) amplifying content and media online. 
The creation of disinformation or manipulated media is the most 
common communication strategy. In 52 out of the 70 countries 
we examined, cyber troops actively created content such as 
memes, videos, fake news websites or manipulated media in 
order to mislead users. Sometimes, the content created by 
cyber troops is targeted at specific communities or segments 
of users. By using online and offline sources of data about 
users, and paying for advertisements on popular social media 
platforms, some cyber troops target specific communities with 
disinformation or manipulated media. 
The use of trolling, doxing or harassment is a growing global 
challenge and threat to fundamental human rights. In 2018, 
we identified 27 countries that used state-sponsored trolls to 
attack political opponents or activists via social media. This 
year, 47 countries have used trolling as part of their digital 
arsenal. Cyber troops also censor speech and expression 
through the mass-reporting of content or accounts. Posts by 
activists, political dissidents or journalists often get reported 
by a coordinated network of cyber troop accounts in order to 
game the automated systems social media companies use to 
take down inappropriate content. Trolling and the takedown of 
accounts or posts can happen alongside real-world violence, 
which can have a deep and chilling effect on the expression of 
fundamental human rights.
75%
of countries used 
disinformation 
and media 
manipulation to mislead users
of countries use 
state-sponsored 
trolling to target 
political dissidents, 





and content by 
flooding hashtags
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Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: This table reports on the communication strategies used by cyber troops. For communication strategies:        = Disinformation and 
Manipulated Media,          = Mass Reporting of Content/Accounts,         = Data-Driven Strategies,         = Trolling,          = Amplifying Content,                                       = no evidence found.  
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Team Size and Permanency 
The size and permanency of teams vary from country to country. 
In some countries, teams appear temporarily around elections 
or to shape public attitudes around other important political 
events. In others, cyber troops are integrated into the media 
and communication landscape with full-time staff working 
to control, censor, and shape conversations and information 
online. Some teams are comprised of a handful of people who 
manage hundreds of fake accounts. In other countries – like 
China, Vietnam or Venezuela – large teams of people are hired 
by the state to actively shape public opinions and police speech 
through online channels 
Budgets and Expenditures  
Computational propaganda remains big business. We found 
large amounts of money being spent on ‘PR’ or strategic 
communication firms to work on campaigns in countries such 
as the Philippines (Mahtani and Cabato 2019), Guatemala 
(Currier and Mackey 2018), and Syria (York 2011). These 
contracts can range in size from smaller spends with boutique 
national or regional firms, to multi-million-dollar contracts with 
global companies like Cambridge Analytica (see, for example, 
Kazeem 2018). The rise of the troll industry is a growing area 
of public and academic interest, and an area to watch for future 
research and journalistic inquiry.  
Skills and Knowledge Diffusion  
There is also evidence of formal and informal knowledge 
diffusion happening across geographic lines. For example, 
during the investigations into cyber troop activity in Myanmar, 
evidence emerged that military officials were trained by Russian 
operatives on how to use social media (Mozur 2018). Similarly, 
cyber troops in Sri Lanka received formal training in India (Expert 
consultation 2019). Leaked emails also showed evidence of the 
Information Network Agency in Ethiopia sending staff members 
to receive formal training in China (Nunu 2018). While there 
are many gaps in how knowledge and skills in computational 
propaganda are diffusing globally, this is also an important area 
to watch for future research and journalistic inquiry. . 
Although there 
is limited public 
information about the 
size and operations 
of cyber troop teams, 
we can begin to 
assemble a picture 
of how much money 
they budget, how they 
cooperate, and the 
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Cyber Troop Capacity 
By looking comparatively across the behaviours, expenditures, 
tools, and resources cyber troop employ, we can begin to build 
a larger comparative picture of the global organization of social 
media manipulation. National contexts are always important 
to consider. However, we suggest it is also worth generalizing 
about the experience of organized disinformation campaigns 
across regime types to develop a broad and comparative 
understanding of this phenomenon. We have begun to develop 
a simplistic measure to comparatively assess the capacity 
of cyber troop teams in relation to one another, taking into 
consideration the number of government actors involved, the 
sophistication of tools, the number of campaigns, the size and 
permanency of teams, and budgets or expenditures made.  We 
describe cyber troop capacity on a four-point scale:  
(1) Minimal cyber troop teams are newly formed or teams 
that were previously active but whose present activities are 
uncertain. Newly formed teams have minimal resources and 
only apply a few tools of computational propaganda to a small 
number of platforms. Minimal cyber troop activity also includes 
states where we have seen only one or two politicians who 
experiment with computational propaganda tools. These teams 
operate domestically, with no operations abroad. Minimal 
teams include: Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Croatia, 
Ecuador, Greece, Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan 
and Tunisia.
(2) Low cyber troop capacity involves small teams that may be 
active during elections or referenda but stop activity until the next 
election cycle. Low capacity teams tend to experiment with only 
a few strategies, such as using bots to amplify disinformation. 
These teams operate domestically, with no operations abroad. 
Low capacity teams include: Austria, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Eritrea, Germany, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Nigeria, North Korea, Poland, Rwanda, 
Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Zimbabwe.  
(3) Medium cyber troop capacity involves teams that have 
a much more consistent form and strategy, involving full-
time staff members who are employed year-round to control 
the information space. These medium-capacity teams often 
coordinate with multiple actor types, and experiment with a wide 
variety of tools and strategies for social media manipulation. 
Some medium-capacity teams conduct influence operations 
abroad. Medium-capacity teams include: Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, Cuba, Ethiopia, 
Georgia, Guatemala, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, 
Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan. 
(4) High cyber troop capacity involves large numbers of staff, 
and large budgetary expenditure on psychological operations 
or information warfare. There might also be significant funds 
spent on research and development, as well as evidence of a 
multitude of techniques being used. These teams do not only 
operate during elections but involve full-time staff dedicated 
to shaping the information space. High-capacity cyber troop 
teams focus on foreign and domestic operations. High-capacity 
teams include: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam, and 
the United States.
Country Status Notes on Team Size, Training and Spending
China Permanent Team size estimates of 300,000-2,000,000 people working in local and regional offices 
Egypt Permanent –
Iran Permanent 6,000 USD spent on FB advertisements
Israel Permanent Team size estimates of 400 people. Evidence of Formal Training. Multiple contracts valued at 778K USD and 100M USD. 
Myanmar Permanent Evidence of Formal Training in Russia
Russia Permanent –
Saudi Arabia Permanent Estimated costs of 150 Pounds for Twitter Hashtag Trends
Syria Permanent Multiple Contracts valued at 4,000 USD
United Arab 
Emirates Permanent Multiple Expenditures valued at over 10M USD
United States Permanent & Temporary –
Venezuela Permanent Team size estimates of multiple brigades of 500 people. Evidence of Formal Training
Vietnam Permanent & Temporary Team size estimates of 10,000 people
HIGH CAPACITY
TABLE 5 - CYBER TROOP CAPACITY
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Country Status Notes on Team Size, Training and Spending
Azerbaijan Permanent –




Brazil Temporary Multiple contracts valued at 10M R, 130K R, 24K R, 12M R
Cambodia Permanent & Temporary –
Cuba Permanent –
Ethiopia Permanent Evidence of Training in China. Estimated salaries of 300 USD/mont
Georgia Temporary –
Guatemala Permanent Multiple contracts valued at 100,000 USD
India Temporary Multiple teams ranging in size from 50-300 people. Multiple contracts and advertising expenditures valued at over 1.4M USD
Kazakhstan Temporary –
Kyrgyzstan Permanent & Temporary
Team size estimates of 50 people. Multiple contracts valued at 2000 USD. Salaries are estimated to 
be 3-4 USD/day






Sri Lanka Permanent & Temporary
Evidence of Formal Training in India
Sudan Permanent –
Tajikistan Permanent Team size estimates of 400 people
Thailand Permanent Evidence of Formal Training
Turkey Permanent Team size estimates of 500 people
Ukraine Permanent Team size estimates of 20,000 people
United 
Kingdom Temporary 3.5M GBP spent on Cambridge Analytica by Leave Campaigns
Uzbekistan Permanent –
MEDIUM CAPACITY
TABLE 5 - CYBER TROOP CAPACITY continued
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Country Status Notes on Team Size, Training and Spending
Austria Temporary –
Colombia Temporary –





Indonesia Temporary Multiple contracts valued between 1M-50M Rupias
Italy Temporary –
Kenya Temporary One contract with Cambridge Analytica valued at 6M USD
Macedonia Temporary –
Moldova Temporary 20,000USD spent on Facebook and Instagram Ads
Nigeria Temporary One contract with Cambridge Analytica Valued at 2.8M USD
North Korea Permanent Team size estimates of 200 people
Poland Temporary –
Rwanda Temporary –
Serbia Permanent Salary Estimates valued at 370 EURO/month
South Africa Temporary Multiple contracts valued at 2M USD
Spain Temporary –
Zimbabwe Temporary –
Country Status Notes on Team Size, Training and Spending
Angola Temporary –




Ecuador No Longer Active Multiple contracts valued at 200,000 USD
Greece Temporary –
Netherlands Temporary –
South Korea No Longer Active Previously active team of less than 20 people
Sweden Temporary –
Taiwan No Longer Active –
Tunisia Temporary –
TABLE 5 - CYBER TROOP CAPACITY continued
LOW CAPACITY
MINIMAL CAPACITY
Source: Authors’ evaluations based on data collected. Note: These tables reports on the capacity of cyber troop actors.
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Social media, which 
was once heralded as 
a force for freedom 
and democracy, 
has come under 
increasing scrutiny for 
its role in amplifying 
disinformation, inciting 
violence, and lowering 
levels of trust in 
media and democratic 
institutions. 
This report has highlighted the ways in which government 
agencies and political parties have used social media to spread 
political propaganda, pollute the digital information ecosystem, 
and suppress freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 
While the affordances of social media can serve to enhance the 
scale, scope, and precision of disinformation (Bradshaw and 
Howard 2018b), it is important to recognize that many of the 
issues at the heart of computational propaganda – polarization, 
distrust or the decline of democracy – have existed long before 
social media and even the Internet itself. The co-option of social 
media technologies should cause concern for democracies 
around the world – but so should many of the long-standing 
challenges facing democratic societies. 
Computational propaganda has become a normal part of the 
digital public sphere. These techniques will also continue to 
evolve as new technologies – including Artificial Intelligence, 
Virtual Reality, or the Internet of Things – are poised to 
fundamentally reshape society and politics. But since 
computational propaganda is a symptom of long-standing 
challenges to democracy, it is important that solutions take into 
consideration these systemic challenges. However, it must also 
consider the role social media platforms have played in shaping 
the current information environment. A strong democracy 
requires access to high-quality information and an ability 
for citizens to come together to debate, discuss, deliberate, 
empathize, and make concessions. Are social media platforms 
really creating a space for public deliberation and democracy? 
Or are they amplifying content that keeps citizens addicted, 
disinformed, and angry? 
Conclusion
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